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TAKING AN INDEPENDENT LOOK AT THE
AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT: WHY NO PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION EXISTS
MADISON GAFFORD*
IN STOKES V. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES,1 the Fifth Circuit wasforced to overturn its own precedent in order to determine
that there is no independent private right of action to enforce
the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) of 1986.2 This was due to a
controversial case, Alexander v. Sandoval, where the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that no private right of action existed to en-
force disparate-impact regulations that were created under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The Supreme Court empha-
sized that “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress” and that “[t]he judicial task is to interpret
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays
an intent to create not just a private right but also a private rem-
edy.”4 The Fifth Circuit recognized that this undermined its pre-
vious reasoning that an implied private right of action existed
under the ACAA and overturned its past precedent.5 The Fifth
Circuit correctly held that no private right of action exists be-
cause there was no congressional intent to create a private right
of action under the ACAA, and due deference must be given to
the Department of Transportation (DOT) in order to balance
necessary safety concerns and troublesome discrimination
claims.
* Madison Gafford is a J.D. Candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law
graduating in May 2020 and an active member of SMU Law Review, moot court,
and the Academic Success Program. Madison earned a Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and Philosophy from Southern Methodist University in Dallas,
Texas. Madison would like to thank her family for always supporting her
throughout law school and her other endeavors.
1 887 F.3d 199 (5th Cir. 2018).
2 Id. at 203–04; see 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2012).
3 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001).
4 Id. at 286.
5 Stokes, 887 F.3d at 203–04.
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Kellie Stokes, the mother of an autistic child, brought a suit
against Southwest Airlines alleging that agents prevented Stokes
and her family from boarding a flight.6 The supposed reason
was that the Southwest agents “considered her son’s behavior
disruptive.”7 Stokes claimed that “her son suffered ‘great physi-
cal emotional and mental pain and anguish’ as a result of these
experiences.”8
In Stokes’s original suit, she alleged claims under Texas law
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).9 After suit was
filed, Southwest Airlines filed a motion to dismiss that led Stokes
to substitute her ADA claim with an ACAA claim.10 Southwest
Airlines then filed another motion to dismiss, “arguing that the
state-law claims were preempted and that only the federal gov-
ernment may sue to enforce the ACAA in district court.”11 The
district court granted Southwest Airlines’s motion to dismiss in
part and, after a motion to reconsider, “held that the ACAA con-
fers no right of action to private litigants” and “declined to exer-
cise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.”12 The district court then dismissed the case, and Stokes
appealed the district court’s holding that there is no private
right of action enforceable under the ACAA.13
In Stokes, the Fifth Circuit had to determine “whether private
persons can sue in federal district court to enforce the [ACAA]
of 1986.”14 The Fifth Circuit ultimately answered this question in
the negative.15 To reach this conclusion, the court had to first
address previous precedent that affirmatively held that private
persons did have the right to sue in federal district court to en-
force the ACAA.16 In Shinault v. American Airlines, the Fifth Cir-
cuit admitted that “[t]he ACAA does not provide for a private
cause of action.”17 However, the Fifth Circuit indicated that it
may imply private remedies even though the ACAA did not ex-








14 Id. at 200.
15 Id. at 203–04.
16 Id.; Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991).
17 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800.
2019] AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT 137
plicitly create such remedies.18 The Fifth Circuit explained that
it had made its decision in Shinault based on legislative history,
practice, and because the ACAA does not specifically prohibit
private rights of action.19 For these reasons, the court in Shinault
inferred the right for private actions enforceable under the
ACAA.20
The Fifth Circuit noted in Stokes that its analysis usually stops
when its own precedent is applicable.21 However, because “the
Supreme Court disavow[ed] the mode of analysis on which [its]
precedent relied,” the Fifth Circuit was forced to take a longer
look at its precedent to determine if it needed to be overruled.22
In between Shinault and Stokes, the Supreme Court held in San-
doval that private rights of action cannot be found when Con-
gress does not explicitly set forth a private remedy.23 The Fifth
Circuit recognized that Sandoval completely undermined its rea-
soning set forth in Shinault.24 Thus, the Fifth Circuit overruled
Shinault and held that “the ACAA ‘is enforceable only by the
agency charged with administering it’”25 and that “[n]o private
right of action exists to enforce the ACAA in district court.”26
In Stokes, the court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s le-
gal reasoning in Sandoval and therefore reached the correct
conclusion in holding that the ACAA does not allow for a pri-
vate right of action. While the Fifth Circuit did not go through a
thorough textual analysis of the ACAA in reaching its conclu-
sion, it did indicate that the ACAA does not explicitly provide
for a private right of action.27 However, a thorough analysis of
the wording of the ACAA clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to provide for a private right of action.28 The language of
the ACAA provides:
18 Id.
19 Stokes, 887 F.3d at 204.
20 Shinault, 936 F.2d at 800.
21 Stokes, 887 F.3d at 203–04.
22 Id. at 204.
23 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
24 See id.; Stokes, 887 F.3d at 204.
25 Stokes, 887 F.3d at 205 (quoting Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 456 n.6
(2009)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 204.
28 See 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2012); Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354
(11th Cir. 2002).
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In providing air transportation, an air carrier . . . may not dis-
criminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the follow-
ing grounds:
(1) the individual has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.
(2) the individual has a record of such an impairment.
(3) the individual is regarded as having such an impairment.29
The ACAA states that individuals with disabilities alleging claims
for discrimination may file the complaint directly with the
DOT.30 This phrasing alone makes it unlikely that Congress in-
tended to create a private right of action enforceable under the
ACAA. The Massachusetts District Court indicated that the
ACAA “provides an administrative mechanism to compel com-
pliance but not to compensate parties injured by a violation.”31
Additionally, there are other aspects of the ACAA that lend
themselves to the interpretation that Congress did not intend
for individual litigants to bring ACAA claims in federal district
court. Specifically, the ACAA sets up a systematic, detailed inter-
nal investigation scheme that purports to set up the entire
method for redress of discrimination claims.32 One provision in-
dicates that the investigations of complaints will be handled in-
ternally by the Secretary of the DOT in accordance with the
ACAA.33 Additionally, the statute requires the Secretary to pub-
lish data related to disability complaints “in a manner compara-
ble to other consumer complaint data”34 and to “regularly
review all complaints received by air carriers alleging discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability and [ ] report annually to Congress
on the results of such review.”35
The verbiage of the ACAA and the specifics of its investigatory
method make it clear that the main purpose of the ACAA is to
create an internal way for the DOT and Congress to handle dis-
crimination claims.36 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the text of
the ACAA and its related “statutory and regulatory structure cre-
ate an elaborate and comprehensive enforcement scheme that
29 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
30 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.159 (2018).
31 Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47 (D. Mass. 2011).
32 See id.
33 49 U.S.C. § 41705(c)(1).
34 Id. § 41705(c)(2).
35 Id. § 41705(c)(3).
36 See Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
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belies any congressional intent to create a private remedy.”37
Simply put, whether a statute should be enforceable in federal
district court is “fundamentally up to Congress.”38 As the Fifth
Circuit has stated, “Courts are bound to follow Congress’s
choices in this arena and bound to ascertain those choices
through the tools of statutory interpretation.”39 For practical
reasons, courts must look to Congress’s intent when faced with
interpreting legislation the body has chosen to implement.
The holding in Stokes is correct because Congress did not in-
tend to create a private right of action when it enacted the
ACAA. For courts to ignore Congress’s decision to not include a
private right of action would violate the principle of separation
of powers.40 It is the role of the legislature to create law; the
judiciary merely interprets the law.41 Courts should not overstep
their role and find an implied private right of action when the
words of the legislature clearly do not include such right, even if
it would be more just to infer such a right.42 The Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of maintaining these separate
roles: “The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the sepa-
rate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.”43 Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit made the correct decision in overturning its
past precedent, now recognizing that the ACAA does not pro-
vide a private right of action.44
While the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted and followed Su-
preme Court precedent, the holding that there is no private
right of action under the statue is also appropriate because
safety concerns require deference to the DOT. As previously dis-
cussed, the structure of the ACAA allows for an internal review
and report process.45 This procedure aims to curtail discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities when they are in airports
and on airplanes.46 However, due to safety concerns, it is impor-
37 Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2002).
38 Stokes v. Sw. Airlines, 887 F.3d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2018).
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704–05 (1974).
42 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
43 Id.
44 See Stokes, 887 F.3d at 205.
45 See 49 U.S.C. § 41705(c).
46 See Raina Urton, Trouble in the Skies: The ACAA’s Failure to Protect Passengers
with Disabilities, 31 LAW & INEQ. 437, 447 (2013) (discussing the purpose of the
ACAA).
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tant that this purpose does not take away from the DOT’s ability
to protect airline passengers. Internal review allows an agency
with industry expertise to effectuate the ACAA’s purpose, to
limit discrimination and difficulties for people with disabilities,
while accommodating legitimate safety concerns.47 On the other
hand, if the ACAA did allow private rights of action, this defer-
ence would be greatly limited by courts hearing individual
claims of discrimination.
One counterargument is that a private right of action must
exist in order to truly deter airlines from discriminating against
those with disabilities. Many critics of the line of cases stemming
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval have expressed
significant concerns about only having an internal process for
reviewing discrimination claims.48 Admittedly, courts indepen-
dently reviewing these claims could have more of an impact on
airlines’ propensity to discriminate. However, this criticism does
not consider that airlines are entirely responsible for their pas-
sengers’ safety. When passengers are flying, they are forced to
completely rely on the airlines and their staff to keep them
safe.49 This is why it is necessary that the airlines and DOT are
given deference when it comes to making safety decisions.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Stokes joined the Second,50
Tenth,51 and Eleventh Circuits52 in finding no private cause of
action enforceable under the ACAA.53 Stokes, though, is espe-
cially noteworthy because it made the Fifth Circuit the first cir-
cuit court to overrule its own precedent that was contrary to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoval.54 Additionally, since
Stokes, the Ninth Circuit has also held that the ACAA does not
create a private cause of action.55 Stokes and Segalman v. Southwest
Airlines, the two most recent cases to come to this conclusion,
indicate that the remaining circuits will continue to follow this
47 See 49 U.S.C. § 41705(c).
48 See, e.g., Erin M. Kinahan, Despite the ACAA, Turbulence is Not Just in the Sky for
Disabled Travelers, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 397, 421–22 (2001) (discussing
why the ACAA is not efficient at eliminating discrimination for individuals with
disabilities).
49 See Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348, 355 (N.Y. 1998).
50 See Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2011).
51 See Boswell v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004).
52 See Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 (11th Cir. 2002).
53 See Stokes v. Sw. Airlines, 887 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 2018).
54 See id.
55 Segalman v. Sw. Airlines Co., 895 F.3d 1219, 1229 (9th Cir. 2018).
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trend.56 With no decisions contrary to Stokes and other circuits’
similar holdings, it appears that courts will continue to disallow
private rights of action to be brought under the ACAA.
As stated above, in applying the Sandoval analysis, the Fifth
Circuit was the first to overrule its own precedent regarding pri-
vate rights of action under the ACAA.57 However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s holding was the predictable next step in aligning with the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sandoval.58 While the Fifth Cir-
cuit followed precedent by joining its sister courts, it missed an
opportunity to provide a policy explanation for its decision.
Many critics believe the ACAA should be enforceable through
private rights of action,59 so this would have been the perfect
opportunity for the Fifth Circuit to express the practical reasons
for disallowing an independent judicial review process. While
many circuits have emphasized that Congress did not intend to
create a private right of action, the courts have not delved
deeper into the reasoning as to why Congress may have not pro-
vided for one.60 Due to the prevalent safety concerns when fly-
ing, one reasonable explanation is to defer to the DOT when
balancing alleged discrimination and passenger safety. This task
would be even more difficult if the courts were involved. There-
fore, despite this lack of policy analysis, the Fifth Circuit made
the correct ruling by holding that the ACAA does not provide
for an independent private right of action.
56 See id.; Stokes, 887 F.3d at 205.
57 See Stokes, 887 F.3d at 205.
58 See id.
59 See Urton, supra note 46, at 451–57; Kinahan, supra note 48, at 422.
60 See Stokes, 887 F.3d at 205; Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 600 (2d
Cir. 2011); Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004);
Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1359 (11th Cir. 2002).
